From 0af928eaa020c1062fdc91598dfdc533966e2afe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Stefano Brivio Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:20:30 +0200 Subject: selinux: Fix domain transitions for typical commands pasta might run ...now it gets ugly. If we use pasta without an existing target namespace, and run commands directly or spawn a shell, and keep the pasta_t domain when we do, they won't be able to do much: a shell might even start, but it's not going to be usable, or to even display a prompt. Ideally, pasta should behave like a shell when it spawns a command: start as unconfined_t and automatically transition to whatever domain is associated in the specific policy for that command. But we can't run as unconfined_t, of course. It would seem natural to switch to unconfined_t "just before", so that the default transitions happen. But transitions can only happen when we execvp(), and that's one single transition -- not two. That is, this approach would work for: pasta -- sh -c 'ip address show' but not for: pasta -- ip address show If we configure a transition to unconfined_t when we run ip(8), we'll really try to start that as unconfined_t -- but unconfined_t isn't allowed as entrypoint for ip(8) itself, and execvp() will fail. However, there aren't many different types of binaries pasta might commonly run -- for example, we're unlikely to see pasta used to run a mount(8) command. Explicitly set up domain transition for common stuff -- switching to unconfined_t for bin_t and shells works just fine, ip(8), ping(8), arping(8) and similar need a different treatment. While at it, allow commands we spawn to inherit resource limits and signal masks, because that's what happens by default, and don't require AT_SECURE sanitisation of the environment (because that won't happen by default). Slightly unrelated: we also need to explicitly allow pasta_t to use TTYs, not just PTYs, otherwise we can't keep stdin and stdout open for shells. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio --- contrib/selinux/pasta.te | 19 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'contrib') diff --git a/contrib/selinux/pasta.te b/contrib/selinux/pasta.te index ce9186f..ed70c5f 100644 --- a/contrib/selinux/pasta.te +++ b/contrib/selinux/pasta.te @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ require { type tun_tap_device_t; type sysctl_net_t; class tun_socket create; + type user_tty_device_t; attribute port_type; type port_t; @@ -77,6 +78,12 @@ require { type kernel_t; class process setpgid; type shell_exec_t; + type ifconfig_exec_t; + type netutils_exec_t; + type ping_exec_t; + type ifconfig_t; + type netutils_t; + type ping_t; type init_t; class capability { sys_tty_config setuid setgid }; @@ -111,7 +118,12 @@ allow pasta_t self:user_namespace create; allow pasta_t passwd_file_t:file read_file_perms; sssd_search_lib(pasta_t) -allow pasta_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans map }; +domain_auto_trans(pasta_t, bin_t, unconfined_t); +domain_auto_trans(pasta_t, shell_exec_t, unconfined_t); +domain_auto_trans(pasta_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t); +domain_auto_trans(pasta_t, netutils_exec_t, netutils_t); +domain_auto_trans(pasta_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t); + allow pasta_t nsfs_t:file { open read }; allow pasta_t user_home_t:dir getattr; @@ -192,3 +204,8 @@ allow pasta_t nsfs_t:file read; allow pasta_t net_conf_t:lnk_file read; allow pasta_t proc_net_t:lnk_file read; +allow pasta_t unconfined_t:process { noatsecure rlimitinh siginh }; +allow pasta_t ifconfig_t:process { noatsecure rlimitinh siginh }; +allow pasta_t netutils_t:process { noatsecure rlimitinh siginh }; +allow pasta_t ping_t:process { noatsecure rlimitinh siginh }; +allow pasta_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file { append read write }; -- cgit v1.2.3