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* selinux: Allow passt to talk over unconfined_t UNIX domain socket for --fd2023_11_07.74e6f48Stefano Brivio2023-11-071-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If passt is started with --fd to talk over a pre-opened UNIX domain socket, we don't really know what label might be associated to it, but at least for an unconfined_t socket, this bit of policy wouldn't belong to anywhere else: enable that here. This is rather loose, of course, but on the other hand passt will sandbox itself into an empty filesystem, so we're not really adding much to the attack surface except for what --fd is supposed to do. Reported-by: Matej Hrica <mhrica@redhat.com> Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247221 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Drop user_namespace class rules for Fedora 37Stefano Brivio2023-11-072-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | With current selinux-policy-37.22-1.fc37.noarch, and presumably any future update for Fedora 37, the user_namespace class is not available, so statements using it prevent the policy from being loaded. If a class is not defined in the base policy, any related permission is assumed to be enabled, so we can safely drop those. Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2237996 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Fix domain transitions for typical commands pasta might run2023_08_18.0af928eStefano Brivio2023-08-181-1/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ...now it gets ugly. If we use pasta without an existing target namespace, and run commands directly or spawn a shell, and keep the pasta_t domain when we do, they won't be able to do much: a shell might even start, but it's not going to be usable, or to even display a prompt. Ideally, pasta should behave like a shell when it spawns a command: start as unconfined_t and automatically transition to whatever domain is associated in the specific policy for that command. But we can't run as unconfined_t, of course. It would seem natural to switch to unconfined_t "just before", so that the default transitions happen. But transitions can only happen when we execvp(), and that's one single transition -- not two. That is, this approach would work for: pasta -- sh -c 'ip address show' but not for: pasta -- ip address show If we configure a transition to unconfined_t when we run ip(8), we'll really try to start that as unconfined_t -- but unconfined_t isn't allowed as entrypoint for ip(8) itself, and execvp() will fail. However, there aren't many different types of binaries pasta might commonly run -- for example, we're unlikely to see pasta used to run a mount(8) command. Explicitly set up domain transition for common stuff -- switching to unconfined_t for bin_t and shells works just fine, ip(8), ping(8), arping(8) and similar need a different treatment. While at it, allow commands we spawn to inherit resource limits and signal masks, because that's what happens by default, and don't require AT_SECURE sanitisation of the environment (because that won't happen by default). Slightly unrelated: we also need to explicitly allow pasta_t to use TTYs, not just PTYs, otherwise we can't keep stdin and stdout open for shells. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Allow pasta_t to read nsfs entriesStefano Brivio2023-08-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | This is needed to monitor filesystem-bound namespaces and quit when they're gone -- this feature never really worked with SELinux. Fixes: 745a9ba4284c ("pasta: By default, quit if filesystem-bound net namespace goes away") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* selinux: Add rules for sysctl and /proc/net accessesStefano Brivio2023-08-182-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | That's what we actually need to check networking-related sysctls, to scan for bound ports, and to manipulate bits of network configuration inside pasta's target namespaces. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* selinux: Update policy to fix user/group settingsStefano Brivio2023-08-182-4/+13
| | | | | | | | | Somehow most of this used to work on older kernels, but now we need to explicitly permit setuid, setgid, and setcap capabilities, as well as read-only access to passwd (as we support running under a given login name) and sssd library facilities. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Fix user namespace creation after breaking kernel changeStefano Brivio2023-08-182-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kernel commit ed5d44d42c95 ("selinux: Implement userns_create hook") seems to just introduce a new functionality, but given that SELinux implements a form of mandatory access control, introducing the new permission breaks any application (shipping with SELinux policies) that needs to create user namespaces, such as passt and pasta for sandboxing purposes. Add the new 'allow' rules. They appear to be backward compatible, kernel-wise, and the policy now requires the new 'user_namespace' class to build, but that's something distributions already ship. Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* selinux: Use explicit paths for binaries in file contextStefano Brivio2023-08-182-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | There's no reason to use wildcards, and we don't want any similarly-named binary (not that I'm aware of any) to risk being associated to passt_exec_t and pasta_exec_t by accident. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* passt: Relicense to GPL 2.0, or any later versionStefano Brivio2023-04-065-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In practical terms, passt doesn't benefit from the additional protection offered by the AGPL over the GPL, because it's not suitable to be executed over a computer network. Further, restricting the distribution under the version 3 of the GPL wouldn't provide any practical advantage either, as long as the passt codebase is concerned, and might cause unnecessary compatibility dilemmas. Change licensing terms to the GNU General Public License Version 2, or any later version, with written permission from all current and past contributors, namely: myself, David Gibson, Laine Stump, Andrea Bolognani, Paul Holzinger, Richard W.M. Jones, Chris Kuhn, Florian Weimer, Giuseppe Scrivano, Stefan Hajnoczi, and Vasiliy Ulyanov. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Drop useless interface file for pastaStefano Brivio2023-03-291-25/+0
| | | | | | | | | This was meant to be an example, but I managed to add syntax errors to it. Drop it altogether. Reported-by: Carl G. <carlg@fedoraproject.org> Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2182145 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Split interfaces into smaller bitsStefano Brivio2023-03-101-10/+61
| | | | | | | ...to fit accepted Fedora practices. Link: https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/1613 Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Drop unused passt_read_data() interfaceStefano Brivio2023-03-101-8/+0
| | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Drop "example" from headers: this is the actual policyStefano Brivio2023-03-106-6/+6
| | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Let interface users set paths for log, PID, socket filesStefano Brivio2023-03-091-1/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Even libvirt itself will configure passt to write log, PID and socket files to different locations depending on whether the domain is started as root (/var/log/libvirt/...) or as a regular user (/var/log/<PID>/libvirt/...), and user_tmp_t would only cover the latter. Create interfaces for log and PID files, so that callers can specify different file contexts for those, and modify the interface for the UNIX socket file to allow different paths as well. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Allow binding and connecting to all UDP and TCP portsStefano Brivio2023-03-091-12/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Laine reports that with a simple: <portForward proto='tcp'> <range start='2022' to='22'/> </portForward> in libvirt's domain XML, passt won't start as it fails to bind arbitrary ports. That was actually the intention behind passt_port_t: the user or system administrator should have explicitly configured allowed ports on a given machine. But it's probably not realistic, so just allow any port to be bound and forwarded. Also fix up some missing operations on sockets. Reported-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Let passt write to stdout and stderr when it startsStefano Brivio2023-03-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Otherwise, it's unusable as stand-alone tool, or in foreground mode, and it's also impossible to get output from --help or --version, because for SELinux it's just a daemon. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Drop duplicate init_daemon_domain() ruleStefano Brivio2023-03-091-1/+0
| | | | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Tested-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Laine Stump <laine@redhat.com>
* selinux/passt.te: Allow setting socket option on routing netlink socketStefano Brivio2023-02-211-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux/passt.te: Allow /etc/resolv.conf symlinks to be followedStefano Brivio2023-02-211-0/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux/passt.te: Allow setcap on the process itselfStefano Brivio2023-02-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | This is needed by the new functions in isolate.c, add the corresponding rule. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Switch to a more reasonable model for PID and socket filesStefano Brivio2023-02-212-5/+7
| | | | | | | | Instead of restricting PID files to /var/run/passt.pid, which is a single file and unlikely to be used, use the user_tmp_t type which should cover any reasonable need. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Define interfaces for libvirt and similar frameworksStefano Brivio2023-02-212-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | Services running passt will commonly need to transition to its domain, terminate it, connect and write to its socket. The init_daemon_domain() macro now defines the default transition to the passt_t domain, using the passt_exec_t type. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux/passt.if: Fix typo in passt_read_data interface definitionStefano Brivio2023-02-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This is an example interface, currently unused, so it went undetected: m4 macros need a backtick at the beginning of a block instead of a single quote. Fixes: 1f4b7fa0d75d ("passt, pasta: Add examples of SELinux policy modules") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* passt, pasta: Add examples of SELinux policy modulesStefano Brivio2022-03-296-0/+362
These should cover any reasonably common use case in distributions. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>