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* selinux: Fix domain transitions for typical commands pasta might run2023_08_18.0af928eStefano Brivio2023-08-181-1/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ...now it gets ugly. If we use pasta without an existing target namespace, and run commands directly or spawn a shell, and keep the pasta_t domain when we do, they won't be able to do much: a shell might even start, but it's not going to be usable, or to even display a prompt. Ideally, pasta should behave like a shell when it spawns a command: start as unconfined_t and automatically transition to whatever domain is associated in the specific policy for that command. But we can't run as unconfined_t, of course. It would seem natural to switch to unconfined_t "just before", so that the default transitions happen. But transitions can only happen when we execvp(), and that's one single transition -- not two. That is, this approach would work for: pasta -- sh -c 'ip address show' but not for: pasta -- ip address show If we configure a transition to unconfined_t when we run ip(8), we'll really try to start that as unconfined_t -- but unconfined_t isn't allowed as entrypoint for ip(8) itself, and execvp() will fail. However, there aren't many different types of binaries pasta might commonly run -- for example, we're unlikely to see pasta used to run a mount(8) command. Explicitly set up domain transition for common stuff -- switching to unconfined_t for bin_t and shells works just fine, ip(8), ping(8), arping(8) and similar need a different treatment. While at it, allow commands we spawn to inherit resource limits and signal masks, because that's what happens by default, and don't require AT_SECURE sanitisation of the environment (because that won't happen by default). Slightly unrelated: we also need to explicitly allow pasta_t to use TTYs, not just PTYs, otherwise we can't keep stdin and stdout open for shells. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Allow pasta_t to read nsfs entriesStefano Brivio2023-08-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | This is needed to monitor filesystem-bound namespaces and quit when they're gone -- this feature never really worked with SELinux. Fixes: 745a9ba4284c ("pasta: By default, quit if filesystem-bound net namespace goes away") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* selinux: Add rules for sysctl and /proc/net accessesStefano Brivio2023-08-181-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | That's what we actually need to check networking-related sysctls, to scan for bound ports, and to manipulate bits of network configuration inside pasta's target namespaces. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* selinux: Update policy to fix user/group settingsStefano Brivio2023-08-181-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | Somehow most of this used to work on older kernels, but now we need to explicitly permit setuid, setgid, and setcap capabilities, as well as read-only access to passwd (as we support running under a given login name) and sssd library facilities. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* selinux: Fix user namespace creation after breaking kernel changeStefano Brivio2023-08-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kernel commit ed5d44d42c95 ("selinux: Implement userns_create hook") seems to just introduce a new functionality, but given that SELinux implements a form of mandatory access control, introducing the new permission breaks any application (shipping with SELinux policies) that needs to create user namespaces, such as passt and pasta for sandboxing purposes. Add the new 'allow' rules. They appear to be backward compatible, kernel-wise, and the policy now requires the new 'user_namespace' class to build, but that's something distributions already ship. Reported-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard W.M. Jones <rjones@redhat.com>
* passt: Relicense to GPL 2.0, or any later versionStefano Brivio2023-04-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In practical terms, passt doesn't benefit from the additional protection offered by the AGPL over the GPL, because it's not suitable to be executed over a computer network. Further, restricting the distribution under the version 3 of the GPL wouldn't provide any practical advantage either, as long as the passt codebase is concerned, and might cause unnecessary compatibility dilemmas. Change licensing terms to the GNU General Public License Version 2, or any later version, with written permission from all current and past contributors, namely: myself, David Gibson, Laine Stump, Andrea Bolognani, Paul Holzinger, Richard W.M. Jones, Chris Kuhn, Florian Weimer, Giuseppe Scrivano, Stefan Hajnoczi, and Vasiliy Ulyanov. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* contrib/selinux: Drop "example" from headers: this is the actual policyStefano Brivio2023-03-101-1/+1
| | | | Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
* passt, pasta: Add examples of SELinux policy modulesStefano Brivio2022-03-291-0/+183
These should cover any reasonably common use case in distributions. Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>